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Chapter 1
u Kinship in Europe
A New Approach to Long Term Development
t
David Warren Sabean and 
Simon Teuscher
Kinship has been said to be in decline at almost every moment during
Western history. Historians have viewed the appearance of the most
diverse new social structures—guilds and brotherhoods in the Middle
Ages, the state in the early modern period, the market and voluntary
associations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, or social secu-
rity in the twentieth—as either displacing kinship or replacing its lost
functions. Western self-identity has a heavy investment in understand-
ing the long-term development of its kinship practices as successive
contractions toward the modern nuclear family. Within this framework,
kinship is the functional predecessor of almost everything, but never a
constructive factor in the emergence of anything. In what follows, we
will suggest that a growing number of studies not only contradict
widely held assumptions about the declining importance of kinship, but
also point to broad, common, structural shifts in the configurations of
kin across Europe between the Middle Ages and the early modern
period and again at the turn of the modern era. In this introduction and
in this book, we do not bring the story of kinship into the twentieth
century, which would require considerations of a third transition and
new structural features that demand treatment in their own right.
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The different national and methodological traditions of historical
scholarship into European kinship present quite diverse approaches,
levels of interest, and progress. While we cannot attempt to synthesize
the considerable and disparate debates on the subject, we do aim to
provoke discussion between different schools of thought by highlight-
ing what we see as broad historical shifts in the articulations and
dynamics of kinship.The heterogeneity of research debates is, of course,
in part due to the heterogeneity of the subject matter itself. How kin
groups organized themselves in different time periods and places, in the
town or the countryside, on the noble estate and the peasant farm,
among office holders, courtiers, workers, and industrial entrepreneurs
presents great differences in both the goals they attempted to realize
and in the materials with which they had to work.
Kin relations depend on a wide array of exchange and communica-
tion. A sketch of long-term developments is necessarily selective, and
we will have to concentrate on those articulations of kinship that lend
themselves to comparison and have been addressed by numerous case
studies: patterns of inheritance and succession, systems of marriage
alliance, the circulation of goods, and the patterned practices of rela-
tionship, among blood relations and allied families, as well as develop-
ments in the terminology and in the cultural representations of kinship.
A great deal of comparative discussion about kinship has been focused
on the level of explicit rules in codifications of law and custom. The
analysis of legal doctrines, judicial decisions, and innovations in legal
instruments certainly remain a crucial task of analyzing kin organiza-
tion. Nonetheless, some of the most important new research shows that
law can be a very flexible instrument for quite different ways of doing
things and that practice cannot be deduced from legal norms.1 In con-
trast to older research, which implicitly expected kinship systems to
have been uniform within broad regions, we expect to find tensions
between diverging patterns of organizing kinship. Examining such ten-
sions, for instance, between the conceptions of kinship that regulated
the distribution of property and the ones that were highlighted for pur-
poses of political representation, allows for a more specific picture of
the driving forces of transformation.
In what follows, we will suggest two major transitions in the devel-
opment of European kinship that many recent case studies from dif-
ferent regions and social settings call attention to. The first leads from
the late Middle Ages into the early modern period, and the second 
can be traced from the mid eighteenth century. The fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries witnessed a new stress on familial coherence, a
growing inclination to formalize patron-client ties through marriage
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alliance or godparentage, and a tendency to develop and maintain
structured hierarchies within lineages, descent groups, and clans and
among allied families.2 These developments were closely connected to
processes of state formation and the formalization of social hierarchies
as well as to innovations in patterns of succession and inheritance, new
forms of delineating and mobilizing property, and novel claims to
privileged rights in office, corporations, and monopolies. While the
first transition can be associated with an increasing stress on vertically
organized relationships, the second one brought about a stronger
stress on horizontally ordered interactions. Beginning around the mid-
dle of the eighteenth century, alliance and affinity, rather more than
descent and heritage, came to organize interactions among kin. Dur-
ing the early modern period, marriage alliances were sought with
“strangers,” frequently cemented long-term clientage relations, and
created complex patterns of circulation among different political and
corporate groups (Stände, ceti, ordres) and wealth strata. From the mid
eighteenth century onwards, marriages became more endogamous,
both in terms of class and milieu and among consanguineal kin: mar-
riage partners sought out the “familiar.” These innovations are inti-
mately related to the formation of social classes and a differentiation
of new gender roles within property-holding groups from the late
eighteenth century onwards. And they also reflect reconfigurations in
political institutions, state service, property rights, and the circulation
of capital. If anything, the nineteenth century can be thought of as a
“kinship-hot” society, one where enormous energy was invested in
maintaining and developing extensive, reliable, and well-articulated
structures of exchange among connected families over many genera-
tions. Even though we are trying to understand systems and structures
as well as general transitions and unidirectional shifts, we do not
intend to replace a master narrative about the constant decline of kin-
ship by another one that is similarly simple. But even less do we want
to fail to go beyond the uncontested generality that kinship at all
times was diverse, situational, and unsystematically interconnected
with other relationships. Our hypotheses aim at stimulating compar-
ative discussions that are both specific enough to relate kinship phe-
nomena to a wider context of social change and sufficiently open to
include variations, alternative logics, and innovations.
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First Transition: Middle Ages to the 
Early Modern Period
How Much of a Transformation Was There in the Eleventh Century?
Historical research has long been building on the notion of an antago-
nism between state organization and kinship, which assumed that as
formal institutions of government grew, kinship lost its relevance.
Lawrence Stone characterized the state as “the natural enemy” of kin-
ship, and Jacques Heers argued that early state organizations attempted
to “break all the ties of kinship.”3 Searching for a period when the state
was particularly weak, historians zeroed in on the eleventh century,
expecting to find vigorous kinship forms. Between the 1950s and the
1970s, Gerd Tellenbach, Karl Schmid, and Georges Duby gathered evi-
dence of a shift in aristocratic kin organization around the year 1000
that has since been considered one of the most significant ruptures in
the development of European kinship.4
In the preceding Carolingian period, the kinship system was adapted
to a geographically mobile aristocracy in which wealth and prestige
were largely based on service in a comparatively strong royal adminis-
tration. In general, representations of kinship were less oriented
towards generational depth than towards establishing horizontal links
to living members of extended and overlapping networks that modern
research often refers to as Sippen in German or cousinages in French.
Hierarchies within these groups were not defined by specific genealog-
ical constellations, but by individual members’ positions outside their
kin group, such as their closeness to rulers (Königsnähe). Kinship reck-
oning was bilateral, inheritance devolved on all the children, and
women transmitted property and could perpetuate kinship identity.
After the year 1000, the organization of kinship changed as the admin-
istrative structures of the Carolinigan Empire disintegrated. Royal
rights of taxation and jurisdiction were appropriated by local counts or
seignieurs, who considered themselves no longer accountable to a cen-
tral authority. Aristocrats consolidated property on a particular place,
which they frequently fortified and exploited as an autonomous lord-
ship. They became sedentary, tied to their land, and concerned with
preventing partition of their estates.
In this context, there emerged new conceptions of kinship that
stressed patrilineal descent and the exclusion of family members who
earlier would have participated in the wealth and prestige of the Sippe.
Both daughters and younger sons were increasingly excluded from suc-
cession to local lordship that could thus be passed on unchanged from
fathers to their oldest sons (primogeniture). New forms of representing
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kin groups through coats of arms and surnames highlighted the conti-
nuity of agnatic groups over the course of generations. Some scholars
even observed traces of a spread of this dynastic family model down to
the social group of peasants.5 Georges Duby stressed that hierarchies
within the new patrilineal dynasties came to be defined by gender, birth
order, and descent, emphasizing vertical structural patterns. Excluded
younger sons tended to continue a non-sedentary lifestyle by seeking
service in warfare with other lords and became the stock of recruitment
for the new social group of knights. The sisters of the successor were
frequently married off to his socially inferior vassals, and such alliances
hierarchically interlinked dynasties of different status.
While there is broad agreement about a trend towards stronger
agnatic relationships being initiated during the Middle Ages, the model
developed by Tellenbach, Schmid, and Duby has been whittled away at
for some time now. Recent scholarship has pointed to kin terminology,
theological discourses, and patterns of inheritance to show that kinship
in Europe throughout the Middle Ages and the early modern period, in
many respects, remained fundamentally bilateral despite changes in the
transmission of property. Indeed, medieval Latin and most Western ver-
naculars abandoned the elaborate Roman kinship distinctions between
paternal and maternal kin. Both in the high and the late Middle Ages,
the most frequently used terms to describe and address kin, such as
Latin consanguineus or amicus, French lignage, ami or ami charnel, or
German fründe, were not only used indiscriminately for paternal and
maternal (blood) relatives, but also often even for in-laws. Only at the
end of the Middle Ages did terms that singled out the patriline become
more prominent.6 Also, ecclesiastical legal principles of the Roman
Catholic Church stressed bilateral conceptions of kinship through pro-
hibitions of marriage within a quite extensive range of kin. One had to
marry outside, with someone who was “un-familiar,” external to the
group descended from great-great-great-great-grandparents and
beyond. This is a negative way of describing those to whom one had
recognized positive links and ties of obligation; theological representa-
tion (largely preserved by later Protestant communities on the conti-
nent) recognized relatives on the agnatic and uterine sides as equal,
with shared substance diminishing only with generational distance.7
Moreover, recent research into high medieval regimes of property
transmission shows that many segments of society were not committed
to consistent systems of property transmission at all—certainly not in
the rigid sense that can be found in more densely regulated early mod-
ern societies. Inheritance arrangements could vary from family to fam-
ily, and even within the same royal or noble family, the principal estate
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could go undivided from a father to his firstborn son in one generation,
while an equal division could take place in the next.8 Some studies
have argued that to the extent that property transmission during the
High Middle Ages turned patrilineal at all, it did so in restricted ways.
Patrilineal succession to specific rights did not necessarily entail a fully
fledged dynastic family organization nor inhibit dividing property in
many different ways.9 It is useful to distinguish between inheritance
and succession.10 While the oldest son might “succeed” to his family’s
main estate and to his father’s political position, all of the children
might inherit property equally both immovable and movable. Patrilin-
eal and primogeniture patterns applied primarily for succession to
those lordly rights and titles that had to be passed unchanged from one
generation to the other in order to preserve a family’s social or politi-
cal status. The shift toward patrilineal systems was, on the one hand,
less general than earlier research had assumed, but on the other, more
specifically related to modes of linking political power to the posses-
sion of certain goods such as castles, titles, and offices that remained
stable over the course of generations. The elements of patrilineal kin
organization that can be traced in the eleventh century were thus less
due to a stateless stage of Western history than to attempts to institu-
tionalize power. Accordingly, recent studies show that the patrilineal
penchant of kin organization was reinforced in the course of the later
Middle Ages and the early modern period as more institutionalized
forms of organizing political power developed. Thus, both the chronol-
ogy and the causality of the patrilineal turn of European kinship need
to be reconsidered.
Changes at the End of the Middle Ages
The strong focus in older research on inheritance, which emphasizes
issues of bilateral and unilineal systems of property devolution, has
overshadowed the importance of marital property regimes, how
spouses bring together, manage, and pass on their wealth.11 In this
respect, Martha Howell’s in-depth study of the northern French city of
Douhai is particularly thought provoking.12 There, between the four-
teenth and sixteenth centuries, a gradual, but at least for the upper
classes, general transition of property regimes took place. In the older
system, the property spouses brought into marriage and acquired
throughout its duration was completely merged. Each of the spouses
was the sole inheritor to the other, while their children only inherited
whatever was left after the second spouse’s death. The husband could
freely dispose of the entirety of the marital funds, but at his death, his
widow stepped into the exact same “male” rights he had previously
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held. This included the right to merge possessions from the first mar-
riage into a second one. In the new regime, the property each spouse
had brought into marriage remained separated. Parents provided their
marrying daughters with a dowry that their husbands could not dispose
of, nor did spouses inherit from each other, and children could claim
inheritance immediately upon the death of each parent. Under both
systems, marital property was frequently regulated in the form of writ-
ten contracts, but whereas the contracts of the older system were
between just two people, the wife and her husband, the new system
required the participation of large numbers of kin who also came to
acquire lasting responsibilities. Members of the wife’s family of origin
would protect her property both while her husband was alive and
thereafter. After the husband’s death, members of his family of origin
would be in charge of defending the property interest of his children
against the completely separate ones of their mother.
It seems that several regional societies developed similar commit-
ments to the non-merging of lineal property, together with institutional
guarantees for and by the lineal kin.13 If future research should show
that this corresponds to one general trend, the most diverse regimes of
property transmission would represent innovations of the late Middle
Ages. In Douhai’s older inheritance pattern, property was primarily
passed on within the same generation. As opposed to this, early mod-
ern partible and impartible inheritance systems alike tend to stress the
devolution of property downwards in the chain of generations, along
lines of descent that were construed as unaffected by marriage
alliances. This shaped perceptions of property as something that
belongs to lines of descent and entails lasting legal obligations of the
members of the family of origin towards each other. While this is more
obvious in patrilineal systems of inheritance, we should not fail to see
that partible inheritance systems were also constructed as coherent
practices at the turn of the early modern period.
There are additional reasons to reconsider the age of both the par-
tible and unilineal inheritance patterns as we encounter them in the
early modern period. Such systems are mainly known from regional
and local statutes or customals (such as German Weistümer or French
coutumiers) that, with few exceptions, were written down no earlier
than the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. Today, researchers largely
agree that references in these texts to age-old law mainly served to
legitimate attempts by central authorities to impose innovative rules
in areas that had previously been characterized by different or alto-
gether less regular practices.14 Uniformity of norms, the training of
personnel to administer and interpret the law, and the homogenization
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of practices, all were part of the development of regional cultures of
both partible and impartible devolution in the transition to the early
modern state apparatus.15
A number of recent case studies demonstrate how group specific
patterns of property devolution underwent profound changes at the
end of the Middle Ages, some of which occurred rapidly, within a few
generations. So far, there have been few studies into the medieval devel-
opments that led to the consistently partible inheritance that in some
regions emerged at the beginning of the early modern period.16 But a
number of recent examinations stress that thoroughgoing patrilineal
systems of property devolution only developed at the passage to the
early modern period. We would like to illustrate this with results of
studies on groups as diverse as the English, German, and Sicilian elites.
Eileen Spring has recently studied the practices associated with
entail and strict settlement in the English nobility and gentry between
1300 and 1800. Although a common law rule favoring primogeniture
was in place from the beginning, families often provided well for
younger children, including daughters, and rules concerning the inher-
itance by females in the absence of a male heir allowed for an estimated
40 percent of property to fall into the hands of women.17 From the late
Middle Ages onwards, the history of property law and familial practice
was in the direction of excluding female succession and imposing strict
primogeniture, patrilineality, and patriarchal rule, with the process only
coming to final form at the beginning of the eighteenth century.18
As in many other systems of inheritance with a stress on patrilineal-
ity and primogeniture, the crucial means of dividing property rights in
the English aristocracy were neither the testament nor legal and cus-
tomary rules, but contracts at marriage. Those spelled out the charges
to which the estate that the eldest son inherited would be liable for his
younger siblings and regulated the contributions families of origin
made to the marital funds of their daughters and sons.19 In the early
stages, grooms provided for the widowhood of their brides by giving
them a dower which amounted to a third of the husband’s estate. But
successively, the dower was replaced by a practice whereby the family
of the bride provided a portion, to which the groom answered with a
jointure, a sum to be drawn upon in the case of his earlier death. By the
sixteenth century, the ratio of portion to jointure was 5:1, and by the
end of the seventeenth century, it had fallen to 10:1.20 All during the
marriage, the husband held the wife’s portion and received the income
from it. The upshot of this system was to throw the entire costs of
maintaining a wife and settling a widow back onto her own family.
Thus, throughout the late Middle Ages and the early modern period,
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both male and female properties were ever more strongly tied to their
respective patrilines of origin.
In his investigation into kinship in the late medieval high nobility of
western Germany, Karl-Heinz Spiess detected expressions of a patrilin-
eal consciousness as early as the thirteenth century. Nevertheless, noble
territories kept being divided equally among both daughters and sons
well into the fourteenth century. In this period, daughters began to be
excluded from rights to the main territories, but continued to receive
substantial compensations at least up to the sixteenth century. Equal
division among sons persisted until the fifteenth century, when territo-
ries came to be more consistently passed on undivided from fathers to
their oldest sons, with younger sons increasingly excluded from inheri-
tance and marriage. In the course of the fifteenth century, daughters
came to be excluded from inheritance even in the absence of sons, with
the next relative in the male line (for instance, the father’s brother’s
son) succeeding to the estate.21
The stronger agnatic stress indicates a change of emphasis in the
understanding of the material and immaterial goods that the high
nobility passed on from generation to generation. In the older system,
each son could marry and found a new line. The risk of a lineage’s
extinction was thus minimized, or—as in a contemporary formula—the
dynastic name and reputation were preserved, while its property was
divided through inheritance and merged through marriage with por-
tions provided by other dynasties. In contrast, primogeniture reflected
a change in the nature of noble property, which increasingly formed
into stable territories with extensive administrative bodies. While the
older inheritance system maintained the honor and prestige of all the
branches of a dynasty, the new one aimed at preserving the integrity of
state-like entities. Indeed, Cordula Nolte demonstrated that preventing
the division of the noble territory was as much, if not more, of a con-
cern of the officers who served the administration than of the members
of a territorial lord’s own family.22 Joseph Morsel’s case studies suggest
that the kin conceptions and inheritance patterns of the lower German
nobility changed at the same time and in a similar way. Here, patrilin-
eal conceptions of geschlecht not only inhibited the divisions of estates,
but also defined collectives with enduring obligations and privileges to
hierarchical positions within the new, territorial political systems.23
A recent study of the Sicilian social elites by E. Igor Mineo presents
a social group that was also late to develop consistently patrilineal pat-
terns of inheritance. This group continued to divide property equally
among all daughters and sons until the late fifteenth century, when con-
sistent patterns of patrilineal inheritance spread rapidly. Along with this
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came a change in cultural representations of kinship. While memories
of past generations had previously been shallow, the fifteenth century
witnessed a rising interest in tracing paternal kin back over several gen-
erations. The political landscape of Sicily had long been characterized
by a strong royal administration. Rural seigneuries had not been direct
sources of political power, and urban social hierarchies depended on
individual family member’s relationships to the crown. The patterns of
inheritance changed in close connection with the emergence of new
institutional mechanisms of distributing power: the emergence of a par-
liament, noble status for its members, and new rules for inheritable
rights to sit on city councils. These institutional mechanisms defined
social and political positions less by personal relationship to the crown
than by affiliation to specific groups. The stress on patrilineal concep-
tions of the family evolved around mechanisms of passing on such affil-
iations from one generation to the other.24
The upshot of recent historical work suggests that in the most
diverse social groups, patrilineal forms of property devolution and of
representing kin groups did not develop as the result of a sudden rup-
ture during the eleventh century and disintegrate thereafter, but
emerged and were gradually reinforced over centuries, with the crucial
period of transition being much later than the consensus emerging in
the 1970s suggested; namely, between 1400 and 1700. Patrilineal pat-
terns repeatedly came into place to transmit goods that entailed politi-
cal privileges and a specific position within social hierarchies.
Throughout the Middle Ages and the early modern period, ever more
goods adopted similar qualities—territories with a state-like character,
titles, and certain properties that served as carriers of permanent, indi-
visible entitlements. Succession to these things came to be undivided,
even when wealth and landed property could continue to be parti-
tioned among the heirs. Still, it is important to see that titles and polit-
ical position always had to be supported by significant amounts of
property, which implied that unigeniture practices worked to establish
a core of property and rights that differentiated sharply among the
potential heirs.
Similarities and Variations in Early Modern Systems of Exclusion 
Social groups of the early modern period provide evidence of a great
variety of alternative systems to preserve the integrity of goods “carry-
ing” political and social rights, not all of which entailed primogeniture
or an exclusion of women. Examples are provided by what Bernard
Derouet, Elisabeth Lamaison, and Pierre Claverie call “patrimonial
lines” among farm holders in France. Here, the patrimony itself, not a
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particular heir, needed to be at the center of practices of succession, and
the patrimony sometimes, even in the presence of a male heir, could fall
to a daughter.25 But—and this is the important point—succession to a
patrimony was “closed,” even when parents exercised judgment about
the most suitable heir. As Derouet points out, in some French impart-
ible inheritance systems, maisons gave the names to their members and
ascribed obligations and exchanges between different houses carried
along through time, irrespective of the particular kinship relationships
and alliances of the moment.26
A comparative study of all the ways that families concentrated suc-
cession in Europe awaits its historian, but attention should be called
to other forms by which families restricted entrance to goods in order
to preserve the substance of specific estates and, where necessary, to
keep the bulk of the property under the governance of one male heir.
The instrument of choice on the continent was the entail or the fidei
commissum, which Habakkuk compared to the English strict settle-
ment.27 It allowed the organization of families around a property that
descended intact over many generations, while its yield was distrib-
uted to family members according to patterns that varied strongly
from one group to another. In some ways, the practice was most rig-
orous in Spain, where it goes back essentially to the beginning of the
sixteenth century. Originating with the great houses in Castile, it
spread downwards to the minor nobility and across the different
provinces, and it seems to have played an important role in the devel-
opment of large landed agglomerations. The fidei commissum made 
its way to Austria around 1600 and to Hungary in the course of the
seventeenth century.28
Noble and patrician families organized a great deal of their social
exchanges around goods that they controlled through their relationship
to the state or to the Church.29 For urban communes in Southern
Europe, Gérard Delille has found elaborate forms of organizing kin that
defined succession to offices, the dividing lines of social inequality, and
the patron client relationships that crisscrossed them. As patriciates
closed off, the division of the population into nobili and popolari was
institutionalized in the form of hereditary orders, each of which had
access to particular offices. The emergence of these dual constitutions
went along with divisions of noble patrilineages into several branches.
While at least one branch remained noble, others could sink to the
order of popolari. The reinstatement of the latter, however, could step
in as soon as the chain of succession in the superior branch was inter-
rupted. Delille’s most recent work is the most ambitious study to date
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of the institutionalizing of kinship structures consonant with develop-
ments in political organization during the early modern period.30
At the passage from the late Middle Ages into the early modern
period, groups of families came to treat public goods as a kind of shared
property. Particularly striking examples are provided by Heinz Reif and
Christoph Duhamelle, who have studied noble families in German
ecclesiastic territories.31 Although offices in these territories were dis-
tributed by co-optation into the cathedral chapters and not directly
passed on by inheritance, narrow groups of related families came to
monopolize them through patterns of marriage and inheritance. Eligi-
bility to the offices became ever more severely restricted to members
of families that had held them before. At the height of the system, any
individual acceding to office had to demonstrate sixteen quarterings,
that is, all of his great-great-great-grandparents had to have belonged to
qualified families. Primogeniture never became an element of these sys-
tems. The canons had to remain celibate, so that the ones who made
fortunes as officeholders could not be the ones who transmitted these
fortunes to their offspring. Offices and wealth were passed on along
separate routes from uncles to nephews. The families systematically
reduced the number of marrying children both male and female, and
established contracts that guaranteed that the property of the ones who
pursued ecclesiastic careers would fall back to the offspring of the sib-
ling who was designated to marry and have children.
We still know far too little about how new property arrangements
affected patterns of cooperation and conflict within kin groups. A num-
ber of studies suggest that regimes of property devolution with a stress
on patrilineality and other mechanisms of exclusion developed along
with intrafamilial hierarchies, house discipline, and claims to authority
that were less structured through individuals’ positions outside their
families than along the division of familial assets. Here, it largely
depended on the main inheritor’s authority whether his excluded sib-
lings and children could marry, establish their own households, or invest
into their own careers.32 There are indications that the trend towards
more exclusive systems of inheritance also changed the manners in
which kinship and other types of relationship interacted. Examinations
into clientage in urban societies with bilateral inheritance in the late
Middle Ages found ample evidence of patron-client relationships
between people who were not related through kinship and often only
cooperated for a limited amount of time.33 As opposed to this, studies
into early modern clientage have detected patterns of patron-client rela-
tionships that were kept alive over several generations and reinforced by
marriage alliances.34 Against this background, new exclusive systems of
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intergenerational transmission can be understood as elements in broader
attempts to stabilize patterns of cooperation and to perpetuate relation-
ships over several generations. A very important mechanism to maintain
patron-client relations over several generations was offered by god-
parentage as the village study of Neckarhausen found for the period up
through the mid eighteenth century.35
Tensions between Representations and Practices
The traditional story is that emerging state institutions had to compete
with older, kin-based forms of social organization. However, some
recent studies have demonstrated that state organization systematically
had recourse to normative concepts of kinship and reinforced their sig-
nificance. Simon Teuscher’s study on the city of Bern in the fifteenth
and sixteenth century found that patterns of mutual support and coop-
eration in most fields presented little evidence of a preference for kin.
Informal cooperation was often characterized by situational constella-
tions, in which neighbors and changing constellations of friends,
patrons, and clients played a more important role. Yet, in normative
statements, contemporaries often postulated far-reaching solidarity
among kin. A marked pressure to act—or to appear to be acting—in
accordance with these norms of kin-solidarity was only felt in situations
that called for strongly formalized legitimization, such as decision mak-
ing in the city council. Private letters reveal that a main concern of
informal preparations for official decision making in the council was to
legitimize alliances between various people by providing them with an
appearance of being based on kinship.36
Larger kin groups could be mobilized for political purposes through
their representation as descent groups, even though they did not share
in property and were so internally differentiated that they had little
everyday interaction. This is a point that both Christian Maurel and
Joseph Morsel made in their respective studies on Marseillais citizens
and the German lower nobility during the late Middle Ages. As in
many other contemporary settings, the affiliation that was stressed in
political contexts was the large patrilineal group of kin that shared the
same surname and had a remote common ancestor. Maurel showed
how such groups comprised very distinct families of different social
and economic status who rarely had much to do with each other.
Inheritance took place within, rather than between, such families. Nev-
ertheless, these larger agnatic and patronymic groups did cooperate
intensively to gain access to city-office, claims to which were thought
of as residing with such groups as a whole.37 In Morsel’s study, the
patrilineal geschlechter were less grounded in intensive cooperation
01-Intro  5/8/07  10:04 AM  Page 13
14 David Warren Sabean and Simon Teuscher
than in categories that were construed for the specific purposes of
political classification and public representation.38
Particularly interesting in this respect are groups that highlighted
patrilineal concepts of kinship despite the fact that they followed con-
sistently bilateral patterns of inheritance. This is the case in the elites of
the city of Bern in the period around 1500 or in the Swabian village of
Neckarhausen during the eighteenth century.39 There, David Sabean
observed that practices of naming children singled out patrilineal lines
within a completely bilateral system of kin-reckoning and property
devolution. Boys almost always received their names from their pater-
nal kin, from their fathers or their paternal uncles. And girls received
their names from their mothers and their paternal aunts. Sabean relates
this to village politics where, in spite of an electoral system, there
emerged a trend for sons to succeed their fathers in offices.40 In such
cases, patrilineal concepts served as informal additions to the rules that
shaped political constitutions.
* * *
To sum up, between the High Middle Ages and the early modern
period, we can observe varied but comparable trends toward more well-
established family strategies as well as more consistent patterns of prop-
erty devolution, succession to office, and political power. In the course
of these developments, many social groups showed indications of a
greater stress on either patrilineality or other modes of passing goods
undivided from one generation to the other. The last few examples
show that patrilineal orientations varied considerably and did not nec-
essarily imply fully fledged dynastic forms of organizing kin. The exclu-
sion of daughters and of younger sons often initially applied to those
goods, the possession of which granted access to political privileges and
to positions in formalized hierarchies. Which goods acquired such char-
acteristics as core property was just as varied as the early modern polit-
ical systems themselves. Some noble families rapidly went over to
excluding daughters and younger sons from almost all of their assets. For
others, patrilineal transmission continued to concern mainly intangible
goods, such as names and affiliations to privileged groups, while the
large remainder of a family’s assets had no such implications and could
be merged, converted, and evenly divided among multiple heirs. In both
cases, transformations in the modes of property devolution were coor-
dinated with changes in the political meaning of possessing certain
goods. In the general, overall trend during the early modern period, we
can discern an ever increasing organization of kinship relations struc-
tured vertically and hierarchically around restricted succession to office,
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rank, and privilege and around ever more clearly regulated—and often
more narrowly defined—inheritance practices. An individual’s fate as
well as his or her orientation within domestic space and within the net-
work of related households, dynasties, lineages, and kindreds was largely
established within the process of downwards devolution—whether
through partible or impartible inheritance practices.
The research we have referred to does not support the common
assumption that there was a general passage from rigidly structured
kin-cooperation and vaguely structured state institutions to rigidly
structured state institutions and weakened kingroups. On the contrary,
the most diverse examples indicate a particular affinity between the
stress on tight conceptions of kin organization and the formation of sta-
ble, highly formalized, and ultimately bureaucratic and state-like insti-
tutions. Both bureaucratic patterns and patrilinear or related forms of
kin organization operate with stable hierarchies of functional roles (the
heir, those admitted to and excluded from marriage, on the one side,
the ruler, the holders of clearly defined offices, on the other) that can
be filled according to predictable mechanisms by a succession of indi-
viduals. And both define relationships between roles along general cri-
teria that can be verified without regard to subjective dispositions or
agreements of the moment. Under this perspective, state formation
and the realignment among kin and family appear as strongly interre-
lated developments at the passage from the Middle Ages to the early
modern period.
At the passage to the early modern period, patrilineal and similarly
exclusive conceptions of kin organization acquired an almost constitu-
tional status. Although this in itself indicates a very significant social
change, we should not overlook the normative character of kin concep-
tions that were “good to think with,” that lent themselves to describe
the order of society and that therefore appear prominently in the
sources. Such concepts stress the axis between fathers and sons, the
exclusion of women from wealth and power, and the continuity of enti-
ties such as lordships, states, and offices that circulated according to
rules that were unaffected by the logic of markets and considerations of
the moment. Thus, focusing on patrilineality without asking about the
practices by which it was brought about can reinforce overly simplistic
images of the late Middle Ages and the early modern period as charac-
terized by static, hierarchical, and patriarchal societies. A closer look
reveals that even the perpetuation of radically patrilineal patterns of
devolution seem, in reality, to have depended on complicated settle-
ments among husbands and wives or sisters and brothers, and on sales
or mortgages that allowed for paying dowries and compensations. It
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was part of the transition we described that such aspects of the family
organization were downplayed for purposes of representation, while
the order of society was legitimized as the outcome of highly pre-
dictable mechanisms of succession and inheritance.
Second Transition: At the Turn of the Modern Era 
Capital, Credit, and Kin Cooperation
During the eighteenth century, in places, from the early decades, but
almost everywhere by around 1750, the structures stressing descent,
inheritance, and succession, patrilines, agnatic lineages, and clans, pater-
nal authority, house discipline, and exogamy gradually gave way to pat-
terns centered around alliance, sentiment, interlocking networks of
kindred, and social and familial endogamy. By no means did notions of
agnatic lines disappear, and there are many indications of new practices
among the middle classes to gather together family archives, publish the
letters of this or that aunt, and to celebrate family memory through elab-
orate genealogies, publication of memoirs, and festive gatherings.41 In
Germany, many families in the decades after 1870 went so far as to
found legally registered societies (eingetragene Vereine), restricting mem-
bership to all the male descendants of a particular ancestor—almost
always born in the early decades of the eighteenth century—and creat-
ing an organization complete with president, treasurer, secretary, and
archivist.42 There seems to have been a need to memorialize and period-
ically assemble agnatic cousins to the fourth, fifth, and sixth degrees, a
matter that still awaits its historian.43 Many of the practices of property
devolution continued into the nineteenth century, such as the strict
entail in England and the fidei commissum in Prussia, but nevertheless,
there are several indicators of a transition—progressing in uneven fits and
starts throughout Europe, and not carried out everywhere, even by the
end of the nineteenth century—towards systems of inheritance that par-
titioned property and distributed wealth more equitably among the
heirs.44 The adoption of partible inheritance rules in the code civile put
pressure on systems of closed succession throughout France and in terri-
tories far across the Rhine. Beginning in Spain after 1820, the fidei com-
missum was abolished in law, and throughout Europe during the
nineteenth century, in legal discussion, political tracts, and novels, entails
were attacked as economically, socially, and morally bankrupt.45 In Ger-
man states, like the newly constituted kingdom of Württemberg, bureau-
crats thought that the forms of closed inheritance found in the freshly
acquired territories inhibited development and a healthy economy.
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The progressive dissolution of patrilineal systems of property devo-
lution was probably mostly prompted by bourgeois concerns, by peo-
ple whose wealth came to be centered more directly on money, credit,
and exchange than on land, monopolies, and birthright. There was, of
course, the problem of middle-class creditors face-to-face with systems
of landed property tied up in legal complexities and not easily mobi-
lized. But more importantly, the century between 1750 and 1850 wit-
nessed a burgeoning of trade and industrial enterprise. Wealth flowed
through different channels, and the issue for those undertaking risky
adventures in mining, metallurgy, textile production, and international
trade was not how to manage and capitalize on a property that had
descended over several generations, but how to bring together invest-
ment capital through credit and assemble reliable staff or correspon-
dents.46 This necessitated skills of persuasion, networks of friends and
allies willing to commit resources to new ventures, and the kind of inti-
mate relations necessary to train the new generation, circulate informa-
tion, provide advice and advocacy, and fulfill positions of trust. It was,
of course, not just a matter of middle-class economic dynamics that led
to the mobilization of wealth. Many landlords of the period needed
capital in order to invest in agricultural improvement, became subject
to land, credit, and commodity markets, and cultivated mechanisms to
survive bankruptcy socially.
There was no single response on the part of family and kin to the
new dangers and opportunities that came in the wake of the capitaliza-
tion of agriculture, the expansion of industry, and the intensification of
regional, interregional, and international exchange. Kinship structures
are not dependant variables, but innovative and creative responses to
newly configured relationships between people and institutions and
around the circulation of goods and services. Therefore, there could be
many different ways of developing patterns of interaction, cultivating
networks, and evolving systems of reciprocity. “Kinship and the alliance
system of the nineteenth century were crucial for concentrating and
distributing capital; providing strategic support over the life of individ-
uals; structuring dynasties and recognizable patrilineal groupings; main-
taining access points, entrances, and exits to social milieus through
marriage, godparentage, and guardianship; creating cultural and social
boundaries by extensive festive, ludic, competitive, and charitative
transactions; configuring and reconfiguring possible alliances between
subpopulations; developing a training ground for character formation;
shaping desire and offering practice in code and symbol recognition ...
training rules and practices into bodies; and integrating networks of cul-
turally similar people.”47
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There are many examples of how this worked, but we can take one
English instance of a nineteenth-century entrepreneurial family—the
Courtaulds—studied in a classic work by D. C. Coleman.48 The devel-
opment of the family textile industry was based on a supply of cash and
credit provided by a fairly extensive network of family and friends.49
Capital was accumulated through such connections throughout
Europe, and it is not until very late in the century when access to
finance capital began no longer to be found primarily among family and
friends.50 Coleman’s study demonstrates the reliance on family, not
only for the many management positions, but also for a range of other
positions in the expanding firm. The intense familial intercourse went
well beyond business, however, as members attended the same Unitar-
ian chapels and carried on a vigorous correspondence full of religious
ideas. And of course, the cultural foundation of familial exchange was
also expressed in considerable political activity. In short, the family was
embedded in a particular milieu of radical dissent, which they also
actively maintained and helped construct.51 It was from within this
milieu that they married, that they found their creditors, and that they
recruited the personnel to direct and manage their business enterprise.
In all of this, kinship played a central role. The generation senior to the
founding of the firm (1828) made multiple alliances between a few
families (all Unitarian) in the later decades of the eighteenth century,
with some of the first connections going back to an earlier period of
apprenticeship of the men. Their children intermarried, creating a
series of ever repeated alliances that lasted through the century. Broth-
ers, brothers-in-law, cousins, fathers and sons, uncles and nephews
cooperated in religion, politics, and business. Sisters, aunts, mothers, and
female cousins provided capital (they received equal inheritances in
each generation), and, although Coleman does not go into their lives in
any detail, it is clear that they were not at all passive in family politics,
and we suspect that they were central figures in constructing the
alliances that determined the flow of resources, the promotion of indi-
viduals, and the coherence of their particular milieu. Certainly they
were active correspondents with their male family members. In any
event, the history of the family offers a fine example of the way in
which social endogamy closely articulated with familial endogamy.
Similar dynamics can be found throughout property-holding classes
across Europe from the mid eighteenth century to the eve of World
War I. Many different strategies of kinship interaction can be found,
but we are barely at the stage of describing and analyzing any of them,
let alone being able to map the different possibilities by region, class,
or occupation. We already know that a particular region could employ
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several different strategies of alliance according to occupation and
property.52 In separate studies of a south German village and the rural
Neapolitan hinterland, the authors argued that the development of
rapidly expanding land markets and reconfigurations in political
dynamics from the mid eighteenth century were closely tied up with
new forms of familial alliance, which not only made for ever tighter
endogamy within kingroups but also ever more controlled marriage
within wealth strata.53
New Elite and Cousin Marriage
The articulation of kinship structures with the destabilizing conditions
of the market, economic and class differentiation, and entrepreneurial
opportunity is only part of the story. We have suggested that the “prop-
erty” around which family hierarchies were constructed, life chances
allocated, and patrilines crystallized from the late Middle Ages onward
could take many forms, from peasant farms and noble estates to eccle-
siastical prebends, royal offices, and membership in urban patriciates,
gilds, and noble caste structures. The complex state reforms associated
with the turn of the nineteenth century brought an end to almost all
these forms of familial privilege. The French Revolution, by putting an
end to the sale of office, necessitated new forms of recruitment, promo-
tion, and tenure, and encouraged a new political culture throughout the
regions and urban centers of France. In Württemberg, to give a German
example, while there was no expectation in the eighteenth century for
any particular office to descend along a patriline, a small number of
families controlled access to office—even the Protestant pastorate
became a closed hereditary caste—and critique of “old corruption” was
already strong by the mid eighteenth century.54 After the reconfigura-
tion of the realm in 1815, constitutional battles surged around the issue
of the relation of private interest to the public exercise of office, with
the champions of a revised administrative monarchy winning the bat-
tle in the post-1815 decade. An administrative apparatus divorced in
principle from private familial interests was constructed under King
Wilhelm I. We have already discussed the noble families that controlled
the cathedral chapters in the extensive ecclesiastical territories in
northwest Germany and the Rhineland. As these territories were inte-
grated in the newly constructed secular states during and after the
Napoleonic era, the older rights to office were abolished.55 As in France,
one can speak here of a shift to a system of “careers open to talent.” In
1811, the aristocratic control of accession to office in municipal govern-
ments in Spain was abrogated.56 Or, for another example, after 1765,
the Austrian authorities reorganized the government in Lombardy,
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ending the formal predominance of the patricians.57 Thus, in all of these
states, the older, closed, caste-like structures gave way to reconfigured
regional elites whose kinship dynamics relied less on the devolution of
specific goods and titles than on the maintenance of well-integrated
networks and multiple exchanges between allied families. Wherever we
look, the class of bureaucrats and officials reproduced itself, no longer
through devolution, but through an open system of exchange, with
allied families building a culture from within which each generation
succeeded the other. The new order did indeed require talent, which in
turn was channeled through connection and networking. Describing
the change here as a shift from vertically structured to horizontally
structured familial dynamics is a loose but effective way to character-
ize the nature of the reconfiguration.58
The changes we have delineated in the economy and state have most
often been brought under the general concept of “modernization.” And
the story of modernization has included the rise of the nuclear family
and the cutting off of extensive kinship ties. What we are suggesting,
however, is just the opposite. The transition to the nineteenth century
is characterized by the construction of systematic, repeated alliances
between families, patrilines, or agnatically constructed groups, recog-
nized by a common surname—however one wants to describe them—
who, over many generations, contracted repeated marriages, circulated
godparents, and took over offices of guardianship, tutelage, and legal
representation, creating tight bonds of reciprocity, extensive overlap-
ping kindreds, and networks of kin recognition well beyond what most
of us can imagine for ourselves today. At the heart of the system was
cousin marriage, and cousins were repeatedly turned into brothers- and
sisters-in-law and spouses.
Coincidental with the shifting nature of political and economic rela-
tions of elites, landholders (from noble to peasant), merchants (from
capitalist entrepreneur to petit bourgeois), and officeholders, there was
a fundamental alteration in the ways that families could connect with
each other. Ecclesiastical and state law in continental Europe had for-
bidden marriage between quite extended relatives. In Catholic coun-
tries, according to canon law, a person could not marry within the circle
bounded by third cousins without a dispensation. Nor could one marry
into the same kingroup a second time; one could not marry up to and
including a third cousin of a deceased spouse. Most Protestant states
(except England) kept the same formal system, but stepped the prohi-
bition back one notch to second cousins, and until late in the seven-
teenth century, did not allow dispensations on a regular basis. The
system of prohibitions made it impossible for families to continue
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alliances between themselves in the following two or three generations,
and what little detailed study of genealogies there is shows that fami-
lies did not continue alliances in the fourth or fifth generation either.
There was no impulse to construct alliances over many generations at
all.59 In England, too, there is little evidence through the seventeenth
century of repeated consanguineal marriages.
Throughout Europe, the typical alliance between two families had to
be one of “strangers.” There were indeed various strategies for linking
families together, and in French scholarship one such strategy has come
to be called “rechaining.”60 Some of the patterns that have been found
include a marriage that closes a circle of three or four sets of in-laws, a
marriage between a father/son pair and a mother/daughter pair (or
uncle/nephew with an aunt/niece pair), or two cousins with two sib-
lings.61 Nonetheless, such forms of alliance can be understood as rein-
forcing certain intragenerational connections, but they do not and
cannot lead to continuous solidarities over several generations utilizing
the same forms. Indeed, most studies so far suggest that these kinds of
marriages are often to be understood in terms of patron/client relations,
linking households of unequal status together.62
From around the middle of the eighteenth century, pushed from
below, the older prohibitions became subject to pro forma dispensa-
tions or were abrogated altogether. From that period onwards through-
out Europe and in all property holding groups, endogamous marriages
were part of the reconfiguration of kinship. Forms of alliance that had
previously been considered as incestuous, such as marriage with the
deceased wife’s sister or with a niece, or were simply prohibited, such
as first and second (or third) cousins, became fully acceptable and made
up part of the overall strategies of noble, middle class, and peasant fam-
ilies.63 First cousin marriages reiterate an alliance from the previous
generation, while second cousin marriages repeat an alliance first struck
by grandparents. Yet, when one looks at a genealogy as a whole, one
finds that in any particular generation, both first and second cousin
marriages can be found; two siblings might marry two siblings, and var-
ious other connections might occur that link two patrilines that are not
directly consanguineal. That is, families frequently put together several
marriages in each generation, linking them through varied paths, but all
with the same intention to draw the bonds between them ever tighter.
And also, very important were remarriages that repeated the same
alliance (with the deceased spouse’s sibling, sibling’s child, or cousin).
All these marriages created a dense set of exchanges linking families
over several generations, reinforced by godparentage, guardianship, cap-
ital transfers, religious and political activity, family festivals, exchanges
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of children for education, socialization, or care, and many more trans-
actions that are amply documented in the literature.64 Along with this
closeness based on familiarity came a stronger appreciation of romantic
love, emotional accord, and similarity of personality as the basis of legit-
imate marriage. This was by no means contrary to economic considera-
tions: the flow of sentiment and the flow of money operated in the
same channels.65 We have already seen how the Courtauld family
entered into alliances within tightly knit religious association and a cir-
cle of political fellows. But they also allied themselves with the same
families over many generations. George Courtauld and William Taylor
were apprentices together in the 1770s. They married one another’s sis-
ters: “From these two marriages came most of the partners or directors
for a century.”66 The next generation found several first cousin mar-
riages, and two Taylor/Courtauld cousins married with a new family
(Bromley siblings), with a subsequent marriage to a deceased wife’s sis-
ter. After some Courtaulds or their allied family members made new
marriages with other families, such as the Bromleys, the following gen-
eration found either fresh cousin marriages or other exchanges among
the newly allied lines. In more than one case, a man marrying a cousin
found he was also doubly her brother-in-law. The political, religious,
social, and business milieu was fostered by intense traffic for well over
a century within a set of allied families.67
Tensions between representation and practice
We are arguing that a tight, endogamous pattern of alliance can be seen
as modern, not archaic, certainly in the sense of being developed during
a period of capitalized agriculture and wage -labor, protoindustrialized
and industrialized production, and state rationalization. It was also tied to
the transformation of class relations throughout Western society: class dif-
ferentiation went hand in hand with kin integration. In a period of rapid
population increase, undergoing capitalization and intensification of agri-
cultural and industrial labor; where class differentiation was increasing
and the pains of harsh economic cycles and subsistence crises were
sharply felt; where regional mobility was increasing and the villages, small
towns, and cities were becoming economically more integrated into
wider markets; where property holdings were becoming decimated and
subject to rapid turnover or landholders becoming subject to credit and
commodity markets; and where pauperization came to characterize large
swathes of the population and affect the pattern of social relations—with
all this going on, property holders of all scales, officials, and petits bour-
geois consolidated and extended the system of marriage alliances devel-
oped in the fifth, sixth, and seventh decades of the eighteenth century.
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The question arises, why, since there was considerable knowledge and
discussion about close, consanguineal marriages—increasingly during the
nineteenth century—among medical practitioners, biologists, and geneti-
cists, there was practically no notice taken of the phenomenon among
sociologists. Novelists showed no hesitation to understand social milieus
in terms of the close interaction of kindreds and frequently pointed to
the strategic importance of marriages among such social groups linking
families together that already had many such links from earlier genera-
tions. Perhaps the explanation lies in a triple distortion of perception
derived from the dominant binaries of public and private, male and
female, and culture and savagery (or civilized and primitive). With
everything relegated to the private, familial, domestic sphere coded as
female, male sociologists were not very much interested in investigating
that area of secondary importance. But they also designed sociology as a
science of the civilized, cultured, and modern societies (the West) and
developed anthropology for the natural, primitive, or savage peoples
(the rest). Sociology might deal with the “family,” the relationships, sen-
timents, and moral dimensions of the stripped down, paternal, nuclear
unit thought to be central to European/American advanced societies,
leaving anthropology to deal with “kinship,” the strange marriage prac-
tices of the estranged other world.With kinship coded as private, female,
and primitive, it could only be a residual category of the West’s past.
The old story of the rise of the nuclear family and the decline of the
importance of kinship is not simply innocent. It has been used as the
model that all modernizing economies and societies are held up to.
Their present has been understood to be our past. The history of the
family is part of the history of the rise of the Western individual, cut
loose from the responsibilities of kin, and cut out for the heroic task of
building the self-generating economy. In the story that Western sociol-
ogists told themselves, kinship became the property of primitive soci-
eties and part of the specialization of the disciplines; anthropology for
them and history for us. Lewis Henry Morgan was the first prophet,
inventing the system of kinship calculations of primitives for both
socialists (Marx and Engels) and sociologists, all the time being married
to his first cousin and watching his son make a similar alliance. And
Weber contracted a “conventional” cousin marriage after turning down
two other cousins.68 The hidden past of Western arguments about the
necessary connection between development and rational family config-
urations lies in repressed consciousness about self and curious projec-
tion about the other.
Our argument here is that European kinship systems were reconfig-
ured in the half century after circa 1750. Even though we are well
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aware that the mapping of kinship systems in Europe is just at its incep-
tion, it is hard to overlook the central importance of cousin marriages
and repeated consanguineal endogamy, homogamy, and familial-cen-
tered construction of cultural and social milieus. This in itself contra-
dicts the traditional story of European modernization—the new kinship
dynamics were crucial for the construction of local milieus and thereby
contributed to the formation of classes in the nineteenth century, they
were the fundamental resource for capital accumulation and business
enterprise, and they were the mechanism for political elites and officials
to reproduce themselves.
Conclusion
In this introduction, we have pointed to the importance of understand-
ing kinship for analyzing some of the salient features of European his-
tory since the late Middle Ages. With all due caution and with as much
complexity as possible in the space available to us, we have suggested
a broad, but coordinated periodization for a phenomenon that has so
far been described in terms of decline rather then of qualitative change.
The process of modernization in Europe had a first phase (the “early”
modern), which saw the birth of modern fiscal regimes, bureaucracies,
armies, legal codes, political theory, and dogmatic theology, to name
some of the most important forces that together shaped the new,
emerging state forms of “absolutism,” sometimes “enlightened” and
sometimes not. Historians have understood that property regimes were
implicated in all of the crucial changes. Derouet has shown how quite
different political regimes at the village level were coordinated with
different forms of property devolution, and most recently, Delille has
shown how across Southern European estate systems, practices of
property devolution, state governance, officeholding, and violence in
their often kaleidoscopic interactions with each other in regional and
local complexes can be examined to revise our understanding of the
fundamental historical processes thoroughly. Kinship is central to the
project, and in this first phase, it resonated closely with “property,”
practiced and thought of as something that continued down along the
generations and around which families, lineages, and dynasties con-
structed their hierarchies and alliances. States, economies, and societies
entered into a second metamorphosis around the middle of the eigh-
teenth century, with wealth, credit, and capital channeled in new ways,
and states emerging that could no longer tolerate the colonization of
their “public” institutions by private families. As a result, alliances came
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to be redrawn, and the private life of coordinated families became the
fertile ground for constructing classes, reproducing the grasp of elites
on the levers of the emerging nation states, and providing the funds,
material, and personnel for improving landlords, capitalist merchants,
and industrial producers.
We are well aware that we are providing here only the first crude
maps of the terrain of kinship, and it seems to us that there are four
tasks that lie ahead for research into this promising area. (1) There
needs to be more research that specifies the different ways in which kin
could operate or be mobilized by region, class, and occupation. Some
time ago, Martine Segalen already dealt with a region of leaseholders in
the west of France that, during the nineteenth century, did not con-
struct consanguineal alliances, as we have talked about here, but con-
stant overlapping linkages, creating chains of in-laws, constituting
dense, regional “kindreds” crucial for access to information, land, mar-
riage partners, and labor opportunities. Or to give another example,
Werner Mosse suggested that among Central European Jewish banking
families, two or three basic patterns of kinship emerged that both set
the groups of allied families off from each other and created close ties
of cooperation within them—with each kinship network being con-
structed on different principles.69 We also need to look more into the
links between the nature of material and immaterial goods (lordship,
offices, education, capital assets) and the patterns of their distribution
and devolution among kin. (2) Kinship, whether studied by anthropol-
ogists or by historians, is subject to quite different national traditions of
analysis. Despite all the criticism by Foucault and Bourdieu, among oth-
ers, the French tradition seeks out structures and concentrates most
centrally upon marriage and marital exchange. The British tradition was
always concerned with behavior and with the “web” of relations among
kin. There were many attempts among anthropologists to combine
alliance theory of the French with the understanding of group recruit-
ment among the English, but a great deal more needs to be done to
think through the two traditions for historical research. Marriage in
Europe, especially where there is no divorce, shapes lasting relations
and provides a long-term element for attaching and detaching individ-
uals, houses, and kindreds. One way to get at the dynamics of kin would
be to examine crucial dyads in the various societies, looking at the inter-
action of brothers, brothers and sisters, fathers and daughters, and so
forth, in a systematic and comparative way. We cannot leave the analy-
sis of primogeniture simply to the privileging of the eldest son without
looking at the lives of the cadets/cadettes. There needs to be consider-
able more research into the resources available to women and younger
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sons. Here, the British tradition in anthropology of stressing “jural” rela-
tions could lead to the fruitful examination of rights and duties, claims
and obligations, of the different kinds of kin. (3) Another important
matter to consider is the role of the state in the shaping of kin and the
role of kin in the shaping of the state. We have already made a great
deal out of the way landed property in the early modern period was
intimately related to and frequently hardly distinguished from public
property. In regimes where the sale of office developed, such as Spain
and parts of France, quite different familial dynamics were available
than in southern Italy, where access to office was related to closed
“castes.” In the nineteenth century, sharper distinctions between the
private sphere and public state function were made, and yet the class of
bureaucrats reproduced itself through the same families. Exploring
how this was possible will probably lead us to local, regional, and
national kin structures and patterns of alliance as complex as those in
Renaissance and Baroque Europe. A related topic is the relation
between kinship organization and changes in ecclesiastic and secular
law. The period we have covered is one of the formalization, uni-
formization, and codification of legal systems, which went along with
the emergence of new concepts of normativity that also must have
affected the manner in which obligations to kin, inheritance rules, and
incest regulations were understood. (4) One of the most promising
areas of research is the way kinship and gender interact with each other.
As a result of the exclusion of woman from landed property in many
areas of Europe, women tend to disappear from the historical picture.
Yet, we know increasingly from the consideration of aristocratic and
ruling families that women were active participants in government and
in the construction of alliances. In the nineteenth century, it appears
that the construction of alliances among property holding groups from
the petite bourgeoisie to the new regional aristocracies was largely in
the hands of women, who carried on vast correspondences and labored
at the integration of allied families, looking out for the educational and
professional interests of the youth, and helping with the accumulation
of the necessary capital for all kinds of enterprises. Mapping kinship
from the perspective of women will probably open up a new under-
standing of what constitutes the political and lead to another way of
breaking up the clean line between public and private.
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